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Abstract:  I survey recent developments in antipoverty policy in the United States over the past 
decade and examine how the safety net and tax system affects poverty and its correlates using 
data from the 2000 to 2010 waves of the Current Population Survey-Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement.  Unlike the 1980s and 1990s, and until the health care overhaul in 2009, 
the first decade of the 21st Century was relatively tepid in terms of major transfer policy reforms.  
However, real spending on most major social program increased significantly, and in some cases 
doubled or tripled, in response to demographic shifts and the deep recession.  In spite of the real 
growth in social insurance and means-tested transfer programs, the trends in after-tax and 
transfer poverty rates were little affected, and if anything, suggest the safety net has lost some of 
its antipoverty bite in terms of alleviating hardship among those living in deep poverty. 
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The reach of antipoverty policy in the United States is vast, ranging from explicit income 
maintenance payments to implicit insurance via the tax code that smoothes income and 
consumption changes across people and over time (Kniesner and Ziliak 2002).  However, how, 
and for whom, to provide support continues to be the subject of vigorous debate (Moffitt 2003; 
Currie 2006; Murray 2006; Haskins and Sawhill 2009; Heinrich and Scholz 2009; Ziliak 2009).  
While much reform effort in recent decades has been directed to making the safety net more 
work-based, especially the 1990s welfare reforms and expansions in the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, concurrently there has been a silent epidemic of disability insurance claims and awards 
that has been associated with a substantial decline in employment among the low-skilled (Autor 
and Duggan 2006; 2010). In this paper I discuss some recent developments in antipoverty policy 
and the association of these changes on the extent and distribution of poverty and its correlates. 
The safety net in the U.S. is typically grouped into the two broad categories of social 
insurance and means tested transfers.  As a general rule, social insurance programs are tied to 
employment or old age, while means tested transfers are not.  Included in the former are Social 
Security Retirement and Survivors Benefits, Disability Insurance (DI), Medicare, Unemployment 
Insurance (UI), and Workers Compensation.  Among the latter are Medicaid, Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), housing assistance, 
and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). This list is not exhaustive, but does 
encompass the large majority of outlays. The other key means-tested program that is directly tied 
to employment is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  
[Table 1 here] 
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  Table 1 contains expenditures on these programs for 1999 and 2009, the most recent 
year where data is widely available across programs. The values are reported in real 2010 dollars 
using the personal consumption expenditure deflator. Over the past decade, real spending on UI 
increased 370 percent, SNAP rose by 140 percent, Medicare increased 92 percent, DI rose by 86 
percent, Medicaid increased 51 percent, the EITC by 48 percent, Social Security retirement and 
survivors by 34 percent, and SSI by 21 percent.  Real spending on TANF was flat, while that of 
workers comp and housing assistance rose a modest 7 and 14 percent, respectively.  While some 
predicted the demise of the welfare state with the passage of welfare reform in 1996, Table 1 
makes clear that the past decade has witnessed real growth in all programs save cash welfare. 
What accounts for this spending boom in the safety net?  The answer varies widely across 
programs, but typically can be accounted for by changing demographics, business cycles, policy 
implementation, and in some cases, policy reform.  
I provide a brief overview of the major programs in the social safety net, and in the 
process describe the target populations and basic programmatic rules, along with recent reforms 
to benefit eligibility and generosity to assist the disadvantaged.  I next use data from the March 
Current Population Survey from 2000 to 2010 to examine how the panoply of programs in the 
safety net ameliorates income poverty, inequality, and volatility. Specifically I construct three 
definitions of income: one that is restricted to private income sources; a second that adds cash 
transfer payments to private incomes (this is the official definition used by the Census Bureau to 
measure poverty); and a third that adds to the official Census income definition net capital gains, 
in-kind transfers, and net tax payments (i.e. the sum of federal, state, and payroll taxes inclusive 
of the refundable EITC).  With the three income measures I assess the extent to which poverty 
rates are reduced by the safety net.   
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Because most transfer programs do not have the explicit goal of eliminating poverty, 
rather the more modest objective of ameliorating income shortfalls, the poverty rate will not 
capture improvements among those persons living far below the poverty line.  Hence I estimate 
how the safety net reduces the so-called aggregate poverty gap, which is the amount of money 
required to lift all persons up to the poverty line (Ziliak 2006; Ben-Shalom, Moffitt, and Scholz 
2011).  I complement this analysis with an assessment of how the safety net affects the 
distribution of income for the population overall as well as for the subpopulation of persons 
living in poverty.  Moreover, I examine how much the safety net smoothes idiosyncratic income 
changes over time by matching individuals across subsequent waves of the March CPS.  
Together the descriptive analysis sheds light on how changes in safety net spending have 
affected the level, intensity, and inequality of poverty. 
II. Recent Changes in U.S. Antipoverty Policy  
Few would argue that changes in the U.S. social policy landscape in the 1980s and 1990s 
were nothing short of epochal. They altered significantly the economic rewards to work and to 
participation in transfer programs, and affected all segments of the low-income population. 
Perhaps no other demographic group was singled out by policy as prominently as single mothers 
with dependent children. President Reagan set in motion the retrenchment of the cash welfare 
program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) by increasing the implicit tax rate on 
earnings and reducing the liquid asset level necessary to qualify for benefits as part of Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. This retrenchment was completed by President 
Clinton with passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act, which abolished AFDC and replaced it with the new time-limited, block-grant program 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Concurrent to restrictions to cash welfare 
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were enhanced incentives for single mothers to work via expansions in the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and OBRA 1990 and 1993, as well as 
expansions in Medicaid program eligibility and later the introduction of the Supplemental 
Children’s Health Insurance Program as part of OBRA 1997. In 1991 Congress was required to 
modify rules for child eligibility in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in light of 
the Supreme Court’s 1990 Zebley decision that ruled unconstitutional previous guidelines. The 
revised rules resulted in a large increase in children participating in SSI, including many from 
single mother families on the AFDC program (Kubik 1999; Schmidt and Sevak 2004). The 
reforms to anti-poverty policy at the end of the 20th Century have been studied extensively 
elsewhere (Bane and Ellwood 1996; Blank 1997; Moffitt 2003; Grogger and Karoly 2005; 
Haskins 2007; Ziliak 2009).  I take these reforms as the starting point in this chapter and instead 
focus on changes to the safety net over the past decade.   
Social Insurance 
The growth in Social Security Retirement and Survivors Benefits from $424 billion in 
1999 to $568 billion in 2009 is primarily a consequence of the demographic aging of the labor 
force into retirement years. The program is targeted to workers age 62 and older who have 
accumulated at least 40 quarters of covered employment in their careers, and benefits are paid 
out as a progressive function of pre-retirement earnings, i.e. low-wage workers receive a higher 
proportion of pre-retirement earnings paid out as benefits during retirement.  Retirement benefits 
in 2008 provided 90 percent or more of income for nearly one-third of all beneficiaries, and over 
half of income for two-thirds of retirees, thus making it the single, largest anti-poverty program.1  
                                                 
1 http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2010/fast_facts10.pdf  
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Little has changed in terms of retirement program benefit structure since the Greenspan 
Commission of 1983.  The most substantive legislative change in the past decade was the 
elimination of the retirement earnings test in 2000 for those persons who receive benefits starting 
at normal retirement age and yet to continue to work in the paid labor force.2 Specifically, for 
those retirees age 65 and older who continue to receive wage income, benefits are no longer 
reduced because of those earnings. Perhaps surprising in light of the current labor market, this 
change came about in part because of a shortage of skilled labor at the end of the high pressure 
1990s economic expansion (Krueger and Solow 2001).  But because relatively few seniors work 
beyond age 65, this reform likely introduced minimal upward pressure on outlays. The other 
change to retirement benefits this decade was the one-time payment of $250 in 2009 to recipients 
as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). 
Like Social Security, the increase in Medicare spending is largely reflective of the aging 
population.  Primary eligibility commences at age 65 for those qualifying for monthly Social 
Security Retirement Benefits, and with the growth in the latter Medicare spending has increased 
in lockstep. However, there are additional forces at work that has led to outlays in Medicare 
nearly doubling and catching up to those of retirement benefits.  First, medical care inflation has 
exceeded overall inflation by nearly double over the past decade, thus driving up real costs.  
Second, recipients of DI are often eligible for Medicare after five months, and with the growth of 
disability, more Americans under age 65 are receiving Medicare coverage.  Third, in 2004, 
President Bush signed into law a major expansion of Medicare benefits known as Part D, or the 
prescription drug benefit, that covers prescription costs not otherwise covered by Parts A and B 
                                                 
2 http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html  
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of Medicare.  Participation in Part D is voluntary, and requires payment of a monthly premium, 
but that cost is either waived or heavily subsidized for low-income retirees. 
Disability insurance was added to the Social Security Program in 1956, but in this case 
eligibility is restricted to those workers under normal retirement age and who have worked in at 
least five of the last ten years and can no longer hold gainful employment owing to disability.  
Spending on DI, and to a lesser extent SSI, has been startling not only in magnitude, but in its 
stealth nature.  That is, unlike other social insurance programs covering retirees or the 
unemployed that receive extensive coverage from policymakers and the press, the rise in 
disability has taken place largely out of public view and yet DI was the third fastest growing 
social insurance program and annual appropriation on DI was $121 billion in 2009.  This growth 
in outlay in the last decade has taken place not because of any major policy reform (1984 was the 
last major reform).  Rather, as argued convincingly by Autor and Duggan (2006), it emanates 
from changes in the implementation of program rules that result in a greater fraction of awards 
conditional on applying, coupled with a greater fraction of the population applying for benefits. 
The latter it seems stems both from a decade-long slump in employment growth and a larger pool 
of potential workers from the increase in female labor force participation post 1970. 
The remaining major social insurance programs are UI and workers comp.  These 
programs were the first in the safety net, having been established in several states in the first two 
decades of the 20th century.  They are also unique among social insurance programs in the 
federal-state partnership that underlies funding and administration (several means-tested 
programs are federal-state partnerships). To qualify for workers comp a person must have a 
temporary or permanent work-related injury or illness that precludes working at the pre-injury 
job or one similar to it.  Nearly three-fourths of benefits are paid out as medical only benefits, 
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with the remainder quarter as cash-replacement benefits or both.3  There have been no major 
policy changes at the federal level in recent years, though some states have altered benefit 
eligibility and payment in order to rein in costs. As a consequence, real spending has been fairly 
stable over the decade. 
The UI system was codified into federal law as part of the 1935 Social Security Act, but 
major responsibility for program rules and administration largely rests at the state level.  Today, 
virtually the entire civilian labor force is eligible for UI benefits provided they meet basic work 
criteria.  Specifically, unless they are a new labor market entrant awaiting the start of a job, the 
claimant must have worked in covered employment in the first four out of the last five calendar 
quarters, must not have voluntarily left their job, must be able to work, and must be actively 
seeking work.  Conditional on passing the work test, benefit amounts vary widely across states, 
though typically it is a function of past wages in the base period used for eligibility, subject to a 
cap.  Normal UI receipt lasts up to 26 weeks, but the Extended Benefits Program that is triggered 
in periods of high unemployment allows for extensions up to 13 weeks. In response to the deep 
recession, in June 2008 Congress passed the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Program 
that added an additional 13 weeks of federally funded UI benefits.  This was amended in 
November 2008, and again in November 2009, so that certain workers in high unemployment 
states could qualify for as much as 99 weeks of benefits.  The nearly four-fold increase in real UI 
benefits to $122 billion by 2009 is unprecedented, reflecting the larger pool of unemployed from 
the protracted weak labor market, the duration of unemployment, and direct Congressional action 
extending eligibility.   
 
                                                 
3 http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2010/workerscomp.pdf  
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Means-Tested Transfers  
The Medicaid program was established in 1965 alongside the Medicare program.  The 
population served differs in that Medicaid is targeted to low-income and low liquid asset 
individuals and families, and is the largest of the means-tested transfer programs.  Funding for 
the program is shared by federal and state governments, and many program parameters relating 
to eligibility and benefit coverage are set at the state level.  Historically the majority of recipients 
have been single mothers and their dependent children, though the majority of outlays are spent 
on poor seniors requiring institutionalized care (e.g. hospital and nursing home).  Like Medicare, 
the 50 percent increase in the spending over the past decade reflects to some extent the aging of 
the population (i.e. more seniors require extended care in hospital or nursing homes), as well as 
the above average medical care inflation. It also reflects higher caseloads resulting from the 
weak economy and expanded eligibility in many states starting in the 1990s for families with 
income 2-3 times the federal poverty line.  Going forward, spending on Medicaid is expected to 
grow substantially both from care of the aged indigent, and as a result of the Affordable Care Act 
of 2010 that will expand Medicaid eligibility to all families with incomes below 138 percent of 
the federal poverty line starting in 2014. 
The SSI program, which was added to the Social Security Program in 1972, provides 
cash assistance to the needy aged, the blind, and the disabled.  While identifying potential 
recipients based on age and vision is readily assessed, verifying disabilities is difficult and 
fraught with controversy.  As described in Daly and Burkhauser (2003) there is a three-step 
process in identifying disabilities: (i) a physical or mental malfunction that (ii) leads to an 
impairment which in turn (iii) generates an inability to perform socially expected functions, 
notably work for adults and schooling for children.  Challenges notwithstanding, the bulk of the 
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SSI caseload are disabled recipients, notably those suffering from mental impairments.  On top 
of the programmatic criteria of being aged, blind, or disabled, to qualify for SSI the family must 
meet both income and liquid asset tests.  The SSI program has substantial federal oversight, with 
grant and eligibility criteria set at the federal level, along with statutory benefit reduction rates on 
earned and unearned incomes.  On top of federal aid, about half of the states supplement the 
federal grant for individuals living independently.  Aside from a series of changes to SSI in the 
2000s that restored benefit eligibility for certain immigrant groups who had lost coverage as part 
of the 1996 welfare reform, there have been no substantive changes in SSI policy in the last 
decade that would lead to the 20 percent growth in real spending, and instead likely reflect the 
overall increase in disability awards also affecting the DI program. 
As noted previously, the 1996 welfare reform replaced the former AFDC program with 
the block granted TANF program.  States actually began experimenting with their welfare 
programs in the early-1990s via waivers from federal regulations granted by the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHSS). These waivers included time limits on benefit receipt, 
work requirements, and work incentives such as higher earnings disregards and liquid-asset 
limits. The waivers were codified into federal legislation with the passage of PRWORA.  Under 
PRWORA, cash assistance is no longer an entitlement and aid is subject to a federal lifetime 
limit of 60 months (or shorter based on state discretion). Under AFDC about 70 percent of 
spending was paid as cash benefits and the remainder as in-kind, but today the TANF program 
spends about 70 percent of resources on in-kind programs and 30 percent on cash benefits.  The 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 reauthorized the TANF program and in the process strengthened 
rules governing work participation.  However, a 2010 GAO report suggests little change in the 
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ensuing years in TANF work participation rates.4 Although the federal block-grant contribution 
to the program has remained fixed in nominal terms at $16.6 billion since the 1996 reform, states 
increased funding during the recession and as part of ARRA 2009 the federal government 
provided additional TANF funds.  These changes have kept real state and federal spending on 
TANF unchanged over the last decade. 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides food assistance to 
low-income and low-asset persons without regard to age and family structure, and thus the target 
population is broader than either Medicaid or TANF.  As part of the 2008 Farm Bill, SNAP 
replaced the former Food Stamp Program primarily in name only in a bid to reduce perceived 
stigma associated with use of food stamps.  Indeed the name change is left to state discretion and 
only 25 of the 50 states plus the District of Columbia have adopted the SNAP moniker.  The 
remaining half either kept the former food stamp name or adopted an alternative.  The program 
rules, benefits, and funds are set primarily at the federal level, with the benefits indexed to 
inflation.  Recipients of TANF or SSI are categorically eligible for SNAP, though evidence in 
Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio (2003) suggests that the links between TANF and SNAP appear to 
have weakened after PRWORA.   
While most of 1990s welfare reform was directed at the AFDC program, food stamps 
was not devoid of reforms of its own, notably the phasing out of paper coupons with Electronic 
Benefit Transfer cards, and restrictions on benefit receipt among both legal immigrants and so-
called ABAWDS, able bodied adults without dependents working less than 20 hours per week.  
Among other changes, the 2002 Farm Bill restored eligibility for most of the legal residents 
removed by PRWORA and liberalized financial eligibility rules, notably asset tests. In 2008 
                                                 
4 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10525.pdf 
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states were given the option of increasing or removing both the vehicle and liquid asset tests and 
most have chosen that option.  Unlike the TANF program, SNAP participation moves 
countercyclically with the business cycle, and thus the more than doubling in expenditures since 
1999 resulted in part from the weak economy. Spending rose also in 2009 as part of ARRA that 
temporarily raised benefits by an average of just under 14 percent. 
The housing assistance program is unique among means-tested transfers because of its 
decentralized administration at the local level.  Today there are more than 2,400 local housing 
authorities charged with setting guidelines on program eligibility for either public housing or 
Section 8 vouchers.  Public housing in the U.S. began during the Great Depression and then 
developed in earnest after WWII.  Currently there are over 14,000 units nationwide serving 
nearly 2.3 million people, the majority of whom are either elderly or disabled.5  Because of lack 
of investment maintaining the properties, during the past two decades many housing units have 
been demolished and replaced with Section 8 vouchers.  These vouchers subsidize the rent on 
privately owned units (though a portion is dedicated to publicly owned).  Individuals are 
expected to cover the first 30 percent of monthly rent, and then the voucher covers the remainder 
subject to a cap.  Eligibility varies across housing authorities, but the basic income test requires 
family income to be less than some percentage of county median income, e.g. less than 50 
percent of median.  Because of excess demand for vouchers and public housing, most authorities 
have created waiting lists that can be several years long.  Many have simply closed waiting lists.   
The final program covered in this section is the Earned Income Tax Credit, which is a 
refundable tax credit that is available to low-income working families and individuals.  The 
growth of the EITC began with Tax Reform Act of 1986, followed by even more extensive 
changes with OBRA 1990 and OBRA 1993.  The latter Acts altered the credit to be more 
                                                 
5 http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2528 
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generous for families with two or more qualifying children and also extended the credit to 
childless workers.  Additionally, ARRA added a third tier by increasing the subsidy rate to 45 
percent for families with 3 or more qualifying children for the 2009 and 2010 tax years.  The Tax 
Relief and Job Creation Act of 2010 extended this feature for the 2011 and 2012 tax years, and 
an earlier provision eliminated the Advance EITC option.  As a consequence of the changing 
labor force composition and policy, expenditures on the EITC make it the largest cash assistance 
program to low-income working persons. 
III. Antipoverty Policy and Antipoverty Effectiveness 
In light of the growth of social insurance and mean-tested transfer programs over the past 
decade, I examine whether these additional expenditures have resulted in any trend break in 
poverty.  The analysis is descriptive and thus causal claims will not be made; however, as a first 
step in understanding the role of the safety net in eradicating poverty it is instructive to document 
how poverty levels in America change once cash and in-kind transfer programs are accounted for 
in poverty measurement.   
I consider three measures of income that reflect an individual’s resource base to avoid 
poverty: (1) pre-tax and transfer income; (2) the sum of (1) and cash social insurance and means-
tested transfers; and (3) the sum of (2), in-kind insurance and transfer program contributions, and 
net capital gains, less net tax payments.  Definition (2) is the same as that used by the Census 
Bureau for official poverty statistics, and thus in comparing resource measure (1) to (2) we 
observe how the level of poverty is affected by government cash payments.  Because net capital 
gains tends to be minimal for most low-income families, comparing measure (2) to (3) permits us 
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to observe how poverty changes with the inclusion of in-kind payments, as well as tax payments 
and credits.   
The data come from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current 
Population Survey for calendar years 1999-2009 (interview years 2000-2010), which is used by 
the U.S. Census Bureau to provide official estimates of poverty and inequality.  The Data 
Appendix provides details on the sample and how the income measures are constructed.  It is 
instructive to highlight, however, how in-kind transfers are defined here.  In-kind benefits 
include so-called near-cash transfers such as SNAP, school breakfast and lunch, and subsidized 
housing.  These are in-kind benefits with a near dollar for benefit market value.  I also include 
health benefits from the Medicaid and Medicare programs, which are much more difficult to 
value.  They are typically valued either at market values, that is, the amount that it costs to obtain 
similar products in the private market, or at less than market rates, what the Census Bureau calls 
“fungible value” (Census P60-186RD 1992).  In the CPS families are assigned fungible values if 
and only if their family income exceeds that which is needed for food and housing under the 
proviso that extra resources exist to purchase private health benefits. If family income falls short 
of food and housing needs then the fungible value is zero; otherwise, the fungible value equals 
the difference between family income and food and housing expenses up to the market value of 
medical benefits.  The implication then is that fungible values of health benefits will be small or 
nonexistent for many poor families. 
Incidence of Poverty 
The first measure of safety-net antipoverty effectiveness I consider is the poverty rate, 
sometimes known as the “headcount rate.” The poverty rate represents the percentage of the 
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population that is poor, , where N is the size of the population and Q is the number of poor 
persons.  Specifically, if we let y denote a person’s income and z a pre-established poverty line, 
then a person is poor if y z  and not poor if y z . In this case poverty is a discrete state 
reflecting the fraction of persons who have not yet attained a minimally adequate level of income 
to meet basic socially determined needs.  In the U.S. the poverty line varies by family size and is 
adjusted over time by changes in inflation, but otherwise it represents the same fixed basket of 
goods and services since its inception in the 1960s and thus the U.S. measure is considered an 
absolute poverty measure (Fisher 1992).  While this definition is transparent, it is also vague 
because the notion of poor depends on the resources being measured and where the cutoff 
separating the poor from the non-poor is drawn, each of which may be subjectively determined 
across time and space. 
[Figure 1 and Table 2 here] 
Figure 1 depicts trends in poverty rates from 1999 to 2009, and Table 2 contains the 
corresponding estimates of the number of persons in poverty.  From 1999 to 2007 pre-tax and 
transfer poverty rates held steady at about 21 percent of the population, but with a growing 
population the number in poverty rose by 7.5 million from 54.8 million to 62.4 million.  In the 
suing two recessionary years, pre-tax and transfer poverty rates increased nearly 4 percentage 
points (18 percent on the baseline of 20.9 percent) and an additional 12.5 million Americans fell 
into poverty.  The official poverty rate likewise rose from 11.8 percent of the population in 1999 
to 14.3 percent in 2009, and with a post-2007 increase of nearly 2 percentage points (or 15 
percent on a baseline of 12.5 percent).  As seen in Table 2, in a typical year cash transfers and 
social insurance lift 41 percent of the pre-tax and pre-transfer poor out of poverty.  Once we 
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account for in-kind transfers such as SNAP, Medicaid, and Medicare, as well as tax payments 
and the EITC, an additional 16 percent are lifted out of poverty over and above the official rate. 
Combined the safety reduces pre-tax and transfer poverty by just over one-half.  However, even 
though expenditures on these programs increased substantially over the past decade, the anti-
poverty effectiveness in terms of the headcount ratio has been fairly steady.  There was a 
noticeable boost in 2009 relative to 2008 as a result of ARRA, but perhaps not as large as might 
be expected given the level of appropriation.  Part of this, of course, is explained by the fact that 
many beneficiaries of SNAP and UI are not living below the poverty line. 
[Figure 2 here] 
Figure 2 explores in more detail the contribution of each component of the after-tax and 
in-kind transfer measure to poverty reduction by highlighting how many persons are removed (or 
added in the case of taxes) from poverty each year.  This is computed by taking the official 
Census income definition as the baseline and adding each tax or in-kind transfer separately.  In a 
typical year between 1999 and 2007 the EITC lifted about 4 million persons out of poverty, but 
with the deep recession and extensions as part of ARRA, just over 5 million were lifted out of 
poverty in 2009. The antipoverty effectiveness of SNAP accelerated over the decade, with about 
2 million lifted out of poverty each year through 2003, but that figure more than doubled to 4.5 
million in 2009, again both owing to the deep recession and expanded benefit generosity in 
response to the recession.  Capital gains, owing to the rarity of low-income persons receiving 
capital income, and housing benefits, owing to the relatively low participation in the programs, 
do little to lift families out of poverty. The individual income tax system (federal, state, payroll) 
has the opposite effect of reducing disposable income and thus in a typical year between 1999 
and 2005 resulted in about 3.5 million more in poverty.  This grew rapidly in the next two years 
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as low and moderate income persons gained traction in the labor market (note in Figure 1 the 
decline in pre-tax and transfer poverty), but then there is evidence of “regression to the mean” by 
2009 with a return to pre-2006 levels of persons placed into after-tax income poverty. 
[Figure 3 here] 
An important barometer of the safety net is how well it provides support to our more 
vulnerable populations of children and aged.  In Figure 3 I depict the number of adults 65 and 
older and the number of children under age 18 in poverty across the three income measures for 
both 1999 and 2009.  The figure shows that on a pre-tax and transfer basis that slightly more 
seniors are in poverty than children, but on post-tax and transfer basis there is a yawning gap in 
the numbers of children left in poverty compared to the elderly.  In 1999 the number of seniors in 
poverty after accounting for taxes and transfers was 83 percent lower than the pre-tax basis, 
compared to 37 percent lower among children.  In 2009 the comparable figures were 85 percent 
and 41 percent, suggesting that the ARRA expansions of SNAP and EITC helped children more 
than adults, but still the numbers children lifted out of poverty by the safety net was less than 
half that of seniors.  
Intensity and Depth of Poverty  
A common complaint levied against the headcount rate is its failure to account for the 
intensity of poverty. That is, individuals $500 below the threshold are given the same weight as 
those $5000 below the threshold, even though most would agree that the deprivation of the latter 
likely far outweighs the deprivation of the former. A transparent alternative that captures the 
intensity of poverty is the so-called poverty gap (Ziliak 2006; Ben-Shalom, et al. 2011), defined 
as 
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 ∑ max , 0 , 	 .  
This measure reflects the aggregate income deficit among the poor population; that is, for each 
poor person we compute how much money they would require to be lifted up to the family-size 
specific poverty line, and then add this deficit up across the entire population of poor persons. 
For persons above the line, , the gap is zero. The attraction of the poverty gap is that it is 
expressed in dollars, and while this means that the measure is not scale invariant (i.e. will differ 
under different currencies), it does permit an examination of how the intensity of poverty 
changes with the safety net under stable units.  
[Table 3 and Figure 4 here] 
Table 3 presents estimates of the aggregate poverty gap for the three alternative resource 
measures, expressed in billions of real 2010 dollars.  In the table, Q refers to the number of pre-
tax and transfer poor.  That is, in the first column we add up the pre-tax and transfer poverty gap 
among the pre-tax and transfer poor. In the column labeled Official the exercise is “among those 
who were pre-tax and transfer poor, how much of the gap remains after we account for cash 
social insurance and means-tested transfers?” Likewise, in the after-tax and transfers column the 
exercise is “among those who were pre-tax and transfer poor, how much of the gap remains after 
we account for cash social insurance and means-tested transfers, as well as in-kind transfers and 
taxes?”   In 1999, among the pre-tax and transfer poor, the amount of money required to lift all 
(pre-tax and transfer) poor persons out of poverty was $261 billion.  By 2009 $385 billion was 
required, or an increase of 48 percent.  Using the official resource definition the aggregate gap in 
1999 was 61 percent lower at $102 billion needed to lift all officially poor persons out of 
poverty.  The estimate in 2009 was $155 billion, or 52 percent higher, which suggests that the 
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cash transfer safety net has slipped in its effectiveness of reducing the intensity of poverty.  Once 
we add in-kind transfers along with net tax payments the aggregate gap falls by about two-thirds 
in comparison to the pre-tax and transfer gap (comparing column (3) to (1)).  Again, however, 
even with the broadest measure of income the aggregate gap increased 50 percent between 1999 
and 2009, suggesting that the safety net is losing some of its antipoverty bite.   
Figure 4 depicts aggregate poverty gaps for children and the elderly in 1999 and 2009.  
The figure underscores how much more the safety net reduces the intensity of poverty among 
older Americans relative to children.  The safety net in both years fills 92 percent of the gap 
among those 65 and older, and under 60 percent among children.  There was a slight 
improvement in filling the gap among children between 1999 and 2009, increasing from 57 
percent to 59 percent.  This suggests that the reduced antipoverty effectiveness identified in 
Table 3 comes from adults between the ages of 18 and 64. 
[Figures 5 and 6 here] 
Along with the intensity of poverty it is instructive to examine how the safety net affects 
the depth of poverty.  Although there are many axiomatically derived measures of deep poverty 
(e.g.Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984), here I consider the simple measure used by the Census 
Bureau and that is the fraction of the population living below one-half of their family-size 
specific poverty threshold, i.e. ∑ 0.5 ∗ , where I(.) is an indicator variable taking on 
a value of 1 if income is below half the threshold and 0 otherwise.  Figure 5 depicts trends in 
deep poverty for the population overall, and Figure 6 separately by children and the elderly.  
Figure 5 shows that by 2009 16 percent of the population had pre-tax and transfer incomes below 
one-half of the poverty threshold, about 6.3 percent of the officially poor were in deep poverty, 
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and 4.6 percent of the post-tax and in-kind transfer poor were in deep poverty.  These rates are 
28.6, 34.9, and 34.4 percent higher than their 1999 counterparts, respectively, again suggesting 
that the safety net expansions over the past decade are not keeping up with the increasing 
deprivation facing the extreme poor.  Have the ARRA expansions fared better?  The answer 
seems a qualified yes.  Between 2007 and 2009 pre-tax deep poverty increased 19 percent from 
13.9 to 16.4, and deep poverty as measured by official resource definition increased 20 percent.  
However, post-tax and in-kind transfer deep poverty increased a lower 15 percent between 2007 
and 2009, most likely owing to increased SNAP receipts. Among children in Figure 6, the 
comparable increases from 2007 to 2009 were 25 percent, 19 percent, and 11 percent, suggesting 
that very poor children were disproportionately exposed to the economic downturn, but the 
ARRA expansions likely ameliorated their situation more than other groups. 
Inequality of Poverty 
A primary objective of the safety net is to equalize post-tax and transfer incomes across 
the population. Although there has been extensive research on trends in wage inequality (Katz 
and Autor 1999), and most recently top income inequality (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011), 
there has been comparatively less on the effect of the safety net on income inequality (Karoly 
1994), especially at the lower tail of the distribution.  Because my objective is to compare how 
inequality changes as the resource definition is expanded to account for the safety net, for ease of 
presentation I first adopt a summary measure of inequality.  Specifically I use the normalized 
coefficient of variation, , which is bounded below by 0 reflecting no inequality and above by 
1 reflecting perfect inequality. The CV is measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of 
income to its mean. 
20 
 
[Figures 7 and 8 here] 
Figure 7 depicts trends in overall income inequality, showing that pre-tax and transfer 
income inequality increased over the past decade from 0.52 to 0.56, and where most of the 
increase occurred between 1999 and 2000.  The addition of cash transfers and social insurance 
contained in the official resource measure reduces inequality by about 5 percent in a typical year, 
and while this is fairly stable over most of the decade, there is some evidence of additional 
redistributive effectiveness over the past couple of years.  Expanding the resource definition to 
include taxes and in-kind transfers reduces pre-tax inequality by 11 percent in a typical year, and 
this redistributive function actually increased by 24 percent since 1999 (and 13 percent alone 
between 2007 and 2009).  This is suggestive that the expanding safety net at the end of last 
decade played an important redistributive role overall.  We see this further in Figure 8 with the 
ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile of the income distribution for the official census 
measure and after-tax and transfer income (the 10th percentile is 0 for the pre-tax and transfer 
measure, and thus the 90-10 ratio is undefined).  In 1999 the after-tax and in-kind transfer 90-10 
ratio is 26 percent lower than the official Census measure, and this increases to 28 percent lower 
in 2009, suggesting again that expanded SNAP and EITC modestly helped the lower tail of the 
distribution.    
[Figure 9 here] 
Figure 9 presents the parallel set of inequality trends as in Figure 7 for the subpopulation 
of poor persons (based on the official poverty definition).  The story is more complicated among 
the poor as pre-tax and transfer inequality has been unchanged over the decade, and cash 
transfers have consistently reduced inequality by about 23 percent in a typical year, the exception 
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being 2009 when it lowered inequality by a more modest 21 percent.  Perhaps surprising, the 
post-tax and in-kind transfer safety net actually exacerbates among the poor.  A closer 
examination reveals that as expected the mean level of income increases with in-kind transfers 
and tax credits, but the variance increases by more, thus resulting in higher inequality than cash 
income alone. This could occur, for example, because of differential participation rates among 
the poor in in-kind transfers and credits, especially in light of the fact that the poor contain both 
workers and nonworkers and the EITC is only available to those who work in the labor market.  
Volatility of Income 
Although much of economic research is aimed at quantifying the costs of the safety net in 
terms of reduced incentives to work, save, consume, and marry, more recently there has been 
interest in quantifying the benefits of social programs and taxation in terms of reduced economic 
volatility (Gruber 2000; Kniesner and Ziliak 2002; Blundell and Pistaferri 2003; Huggett and 
Parra 2010).  This is important because a central goal of economic policy is to stabilize 
household consumption in the presence of adverse economic events, whether the shocks are 
economy wide or idiosyncratic.  Most transfers are explicit in their stabilizing role because they 
provide direct cash or near-cash income support.  Progressive income taxes of the sort found in 
the U.S. provide implicit insurance because when before-tax income falls the household’s tax 
burden also falls so that after-tax spendable income drops by less than the drop in pre-tax 
income.  Combined the U.S. tax and transfer system should reduce the volatility of income. 
To measure volatility I adopt the metric employed by Ziliak, Hardy, and Bollinger (2011) 
for earnings volatility; namely the standard deviation of the arc percent change defined as 
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 100 ∗ , 
where  is income for person i in time t, and , is the person-specific time mean 
across the matched pair of years. The key advantages of this measure over the variance of log 
income is that it is defined even if income is zero in one of the two years, and that it is symmetric 
and bounded below by -200 percent and above by +200 percent.  However, the symmetry 
property is violated if income is negative one year, say due to a business loss, and positive the 
next. As a consequence, Ziliak, et al.  modify the arithmetic mean in the denominator as 
, where abs(.) refers to the absolute value. This modified measure at once 
permits negative incomes and retains the symmetry property of -200 percent and +200 percent. 
[Figures 10 and 11] 
 Figures 10 and 11 depict trends in income volatility over the past decade for the 
population overall and those living in poverty.  As described in the appendix, the data for this 
analysis comes from the March CPS whereby I exploit the longitudinal dimension of the survey 
design that permits linking of the same individual across two consecutive years.  The unit of 
analysis is the head of household for those families with the same head in both years.  The 
poverty sample in Figure 11 imposes the additional restriction that the family remain in poverty 
for both years (as defined by the official definition).  Figure 10 reveals that income volatility 
across all measures was fairly stable over the decade, with the possible exception of pre-tax and 
transfer income volatility that showed signs of increasing during the recent recession.  The safety 
net plays a big role in reducing income volatility—the post-tax and in-kind transfer series is 
about 30 percent lower than the pre-tax and transfer counterpart in an average year.  This income 
smoothing increased during the recession, likely in response to ARRA programs. 
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 Figure 11 shows that among the poor the level of income volatility is much higher (by 
about 70 percent) in any given year relative to the population as a whole, and that the trend in 
pre-tax and transfer volatility actually declined after 2006.  Again the safety net plays a vital role 
for the poor in that in a typical year income volatility after-tax and in-kind transfers is 40 percent 
lower compared to pre-tax and transfer income.  This effect is one-third larger than for the 
population overall.  On the contrary Figure 11 also shows a trend increase in the volatility of 
income once the safety net programs are accounted for in the resource measure.  In fact the 
official measure smoothes income volatility 25 percent less in 2009 than in 1999, while the after-
tax and in-kind transfer measure smoothes 12 percent less, suggesting that the effectiveness of 
the explicit and implicit insurance provided by the safety net is weaker in the current downturn 
for the poor. 
IV. Conclusion 
I provide an overview of recent developments in antipoverty policy in the United States 
and then document how the growth in social insurance and means-tested transfers have affected 
income poverty, inequality, and volatility using data from the CPS.  I find that with few 
exceptions real spending on the safety net increased substantially in the past decade, owing 
primarily to demographic shifts and business cycles rather than fundamental policy reforms.   
In 1999 the safety net lifted nearly 30 million Americans out of poverty, and in 2009 
nearly 40 million were lifted above the poverty line, but in each year this translates into just over 
50 percent of the pre-tax and pre-transfer poor.  Thus, despite the increased spending the anti-
poverty effectiveness of the safety net was little changed.  Indeed, I provide evidence that  this 
enhanced spending has not necessarily translated into improved economic status of the poorest 
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poor in America as the intensity and volatility of after-tax and transfer poverty have increased in 
recent years. 
What likely accounts for the lackluster performance of the safety net in combating 
poverty, especially deep poverty?  Part of the reason owes to the fact that the social insurance 
programs in the safety net are not targeted directly to the poor.  This implies that the growth in 
Social Security, Medicare, UI, DI, and workers comp could in fact be improving the outcomes of 
middle class families rather than the poor per se.  Likewise, among means-tested transfers, the 
growth in Medicaid occurred among those with gross incomes one to two times the poverty line, 
and SNAP growth likely occurred among households recently suffering job loss and some of 
those have gross incomes above the poverty line (recall SNAP eligibility extends to 130 percent 
of poverty).  In addition, the near 50 percent increase in the EITC clearly improved the 
employment of single mothers with dependent children, but evidence in Ziliak (2009) suggests 
that among low-skilled single mothers the combination of welfare reform and the EITC 
expansions resulted in lower after-tax and transfer incomes. The higher earnings coupled with 
EITC supplements were insufficient to offset the loss of other transfer income among those in 
deep poverty.  These trends suggest that future policy reforms need to be directed at improving 
the outcomes of the truly disadvantaged. 
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Data Appendix 
The data derive from the 2000–2010 waves (1999–2009 calendar years) of the March 
Annual Social and Economic Study of the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The CPS is the 
data source used in constructing official poverty statistics in the U.S., and I follow the same 
method. Specifically the unit of analysis is noninstitutionalized families (including related 
subfamilies) and unrelated individuals. The survey is fielded in March and the income 
information refers to the previous year. The family is the basic unit of analysis for poverty 
measurement, where family means two or more persons residing together and related by 
marriage, birth, or adoption. The income of all family members is summed to yield total family 
income for the year, and members of related subfamilies are assigned the family income of the 
primary family unit.  
In the United States economic resources for the purposes of poverty measurement entail 
highly liquid forms of money income. This includes earnings, Social Security (retirement, 
disability, and survivors benefits), Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment Insurance, 
workers’ compensation, Temporary Assistant to Needy Families and other forms of public cash 
welfare, veterans’ payments, pension income, rent/interest/dividend income, royalties, income 
from estates, trusts, educational assistance, alimony, child support, assistance from outside the 
household, and other income sources. Income, as defined above, is summed up across all 
income-earning family members and the total is compared to the poverty threshold for that 
family’s size. The threshold is updated annually by changes in the Consumer Price Index-All 
Urban Consumers, thus making poverty comparisons over time inflation adjusted.  All 
individuals in the family are assigned the same poverty status, related subfamilies are assigned 
the poverty status of the prime family, and unrelated individuals are assigned the poverty status 
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based on their own income and relevant threshold. There are several groups of individuals not 
accounted for in this definition including unrelated individuals under age 15 (such as foster 
children), and those individuals who are institutionalized, living in college dorms, military 
barracks, or the homeless living outside of shelters. All estimates are weighted using the 
individual weight supplied by the Census Bureau. 
In addition to official poverty rates, I consider two alternative definitions of income.  The 
first is pre-tax and pre-transfer income, which only includes income from private sources and 
thus excludes any form of government transfer payments.  The second is after-tax and in-kind 
transfer income.  This measure is similar to the definition of resources recommended by the 
National Academy of Sciences Panel on Poverty Measurement (Citro and Michael 1995).  This 
measure adds to the official Census income definition net capital gains as well as the dollar value 
of near-cash in-kind transfers like food stamps (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), 
school lunch, and housing subsidies. It also adds the imputed value of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit and subtracts federal, state, and payroll tax payments. Moreover, I include the imputed 
value of Medicaid and Medicare.  Health benefits are typically valued either at market values, 
that is, the amount that it costs to obtain similar products in the private market, or at less than 
market rates, what the Census Bureau calls “fungible value” (Census P60-186RD 1992).  In the 
CPS families are assigned fungible values if and only if their family income exceeds that which 
is needed for food and housing under the proviso that extra resources exist to purchase private 
health benefits. If family income falls short of food and housing needs then the fungible value is 
zero; otherwise, the fungible value equals the difference between family income and food and 
housing expenses up to the market value of medical benefits. 
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The sample selection used in constructing measures of income volatility differs from that 
used in constructing poverty rates and gaps.  Specifically, I follow Ziliak, et al. (2011) by noting 
that the rotating design of the CPS means that a respondent is in sample for 4 months, out 8 
months, and in another 4 months, and this makes it possible to match approximately one-half of 
the sample from one March interview to the next. Following the recommended Census procedure 
I perform an initial match of individuals on the basis of five variables—month in sample (months 
1-4 for year 1, months 5-8 for year 2); gender; line number (unique person id); household 
identifier; household number; and state of residence. I then cross check the initial match on two 
additional criteria: race and age of the individual. If the race of the person changed I delete that 
observation. Also, if the age of the person fell, or if age increased by more than two years (owing 
to the staggered timing of the initial and final interviews), then I delete those observations on the 
assumption that they were bad matches. Unlike Ziliak, et al., I do not eliminate observations with 
allocated incomes or adjust for CPS changes in top coding procedures over time. 
All income data used in constructing the measures of poverty gaps, inequality, and 
volatility is deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditure Deflator with 2010 base year.   
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Table 1. Expenditures on Selected Social Insurance and Means 
Tested Transfer Programs 
  1999  2009
Social Insurance    
OASI 424  568
Medicare 270  519
Disability Insurance 65  121
Workers Compensationa 55  59
Unemployment Insurance 26  122
     
Means Tested Transfers and Credits 
Medicaid 260  392
Supplemental Security Income 39  47
TANF 29  29
Food Stamps/SNAP 23  55
Housing Assistancea 36  41
Earned Income Tax Credit 40  59
Note: The data are billions $2010.  They are drawn from selected 
years of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2010 Social 
Security Bulletin-Annual Statistical Supplement , and USDA and 
IRS Websites. a  Data from 2008.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Millions of Persons in Poverty by Alternative Resource Definition
Year 
Pre-tax and 
transfer Official 
After tax and 
in-kind 
transfers
Percent 
Reduction 
(%)
Percent 
Reduction 
(%)
  (1) (2) (3) (2) ÷ (1) (3) ÷ (2)
1999 54.8 32.3 26.7 -41 -17
2000 54.5 31.6 27.0 -42 -14
2001 56.4 32.9 27.8 -42 -15
2002 59.9 34.6 29.0 -42 -16
2003 61.3 35.9 30.2 -41 -16
2004 62.8 37.0 31.1 -41 -16
2005 61.9 36.9 30.9 -40 -16
2006 61.1 36.5 30.5 -40 -16
2007 62.4 37.3 31.0 -40 -17
2008 66.9 39.8 33.8 -40 -15
2009 74.8 43.5 35.1 -42 -19
  
 
  
 
 
 
Table 3.  Trends in Aggregate Poverty Gaps
Year 
Pre-tax and 
transfer Official 
After tax and 
in-kind 
transfers
Percent 
Reduction 
(%)
Percent 
Reduction 
(%)
  (1) (2) (3) (2) ÷ (1) (3) ÷ (2)
1999 261 102 84 -61 -18
2000 270 104 90 -62 -14
2001 288 112 94 -61 -16
2002 308 119 101 -61 -15
2003 321 127 106 -60 -16
2004 324 130 110 -60 -16
2005 324 132 111 -59 -16
2006 314 129 108 -59 -16
2007 323 129 108 -60 -16
2008 347 141 116 -60 -17
2009 385 155 125 -60 -19
Note: Billions of $2010 
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Figure 1.  Trends in Poverty Rates
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Figure 2.  Change in Number of Persons in Poverty Relative 
to the Official Definition by Component
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Figure 3.  Adults Age 65+ and Children under Age 18 in 
Poverty by Alternative Resource Definitions
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Figure 4. Aggregate Poverty Gaps among the Elderly and 
Children by Alternative Resource Definitions
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Figure 5.  Trends in Deep Poverty
Pre-tax and transfer Official After tax and in-kind transfers
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Figure 7.  Trends in Income Inequality
Pre-tax and transfer Official After tax and in-kind transfers
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Figure 9. Trends in Income Inequality among the Poor
Pre-tax and transfer Official After tax and in-kind transfers
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Figure 10.  Trends in Family Income Volatility
Pre-tax and transfer Official After tax and in-kind transfers
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Figure 11.  Trends in Family Income Volatility among the 
Poor
Pre-tax and transfer Official After tax and in-kind transfers
